How does Lightning not work against miners incentives?

As the title says, could someone explain how Lightning does not work against the transaction fee incentive for miners?

As it is, Lightning operators pay fees at two interactions, when they open and when they close channels. Lightning as a protocol looks at a channels age (length it's been open) and other metrics (liquidity, etc) to determine if it'll use the channel as a hop or not when routing payments. Some channels have been online for a year+ because Lightning likes seniority. This means in practice, operators generally pay for the fee to open their channel, and rarely (if ever) pay the fee to close their channels (since they never close them). You can check out amboss.space for lightning statistics

With the above in mind, some will say, "well miners like it because it puts a new tx in a block to grab with an associated fee". Which, sure, but say that lightning channel tunnels 10k transactions in the time it paid 2 on-chain fees. Wouldn't the miner have been better off with those 10k transactions generating fees, instead of the channels two?

It seems to me, the two incentives of the protocols work against each other. Lightning under cuts Bitcoins transaction fee model by removing the fee from the miners hands, and giving it to the node operator, with the hope that eventually the node will close their channel and the miner will get their due cuts. The node operators are also paying as little fees as they can when they do open/close their channels, as to ensure their chances of profitability from routing payments.